In Latin America, Large Agricultural Estates Owned by Families or Corporations.
Introduction
Before long after Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff was reelected in 2014, her newly appointed minister of agriculture claimed that the big unproductive landholdings known as latifundios "no longer exist[ed]" in Brazil (Reference PassosPassos 2015). The comment ignited a controversy among social movements and sparked a flurry of responses from members of the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), who accused the minister of bowing to the interests of the landowning course and seeking to sabotage efforts for agrestal reform. The strongest reaction came from the Landless Workers Movement (Movimento Sem Terra), who launched protests around the land and blocked roads to demand the removal of the minister. The MST insisted that latifundio not only was still prevalent throughout much of the country but that the problem connected to exist a central event for Brazil'due south economic development.
Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, the agrarian question and the role of the latifundio was a major focal point in the debates on Latin American development. This was especially the case among Latin American scholars, who wrote numerous studies on the big rural estates that dominated their countries' agrarian structures. Authors similar Alberto Passos Guimarães (Reference Guimarães1964) of Brazil and Miguel Acosta Saignes (Reference Acosta Saignes[1938] 2009) of Venezuela placed the trouble of latifundio at the heart of their explanations for economical backwardness in their countries, focusing on the coercive labor regimes that predominated on these estates, and the consequences for the formation of domestic markets for industry.
Nevertheless, in more recent years accent has shifted to other explanations, and the focus on agrarian structures has declined. Since the 1970s, dependency-inspired approaches turned the focus toward international merchandise relations and countries' particular integration into the world economy, whereas more than recent approaches focus on the state, state capacity, and the qualities of a state's political and economic institutions. Latifundio is ofttimes seen every bit a thing of the past, no longer a relevant factor in economic development. Indeed, some have questioned whether we tin even speak of an agrarian question in the globalized globe of the twenty-first century (Reference BernsteinBernstein 2006).
A look at the information on Latin American agriculture, however, would seem to suggest otherwise. Not but have the infamous latifundio landholdings non disappeared, but they continue to dominate the landscape throughout much of the region. Though the labor regimes that once predominated on these estates have been transformed, and many large estates take modernized, they continue to greatly underutilize the state that they occupy, oftentimes grazing cattle on massive tracts of fertile land instead of carrying out intensive cultivation. In other words, the continued authorization of the large, underproductive landholdings still contributes to underdevelopment, not because of the persistence of certain social relations, every bit once argued, but rather considering of systematic underinvestment and underutilization of the state and the consequences this has for the deepening of domestic markets.
In this study, I make a example for bringing the latifundio "dorsum in" to explanations of underdevelopment in Latin America. I debate that the tendency for scholars to focus on the labor regimes in agriculture has led them to misunderstand the logic of the latifundio, both past and present, and to overlook what is more important: the property relations. Widespread portfolio-based state appropriation has meant that the property relations feature of big landholdings have oftentimes changed little from those of the traditional latifundio, and thus a like productive logic has remained in place. This has led to a short-circuiting of the process of capital accumulation in agronomics, which in turn has cut brusk the process of industrialization and capitalist development. Using data from agricultural censuses in various countries along with various sources on land appropriation and country apply, I try to show that the persistence of the latifundio agrarian structures means there is still an unresolved agrarian question throughout much of Latin America, and this is still a major impediment to sustained processes of backer development.
The Focus on Labor Regimes
For many Latin American scholars seeking to explain their region'due south backwardness in the first half of the twentieth century, the prevalence of latifundio-dominated agrarian structures was key. The latifundio was seen as a key impediment to economic development due to its feudal-like social relations, its tendency for monocropping, and its negative affect on the formation of domestic markets. Still, information technology was these scholars' accent on the labor regimes that were feature of the latifundio that prevented them from fully grasping the nature of the problem.
In his pioneering 1938 book, Venezuelan anthropologist Miguel Acosta Saignes stressed the office that the rural economy played in blocking the germination a domestic market for industry: "The primary problem of Venezuelan industrialization centers on the meager domestic market. The corking majority of peasants that have admittedly no capacity for consumption must be converted into masses capable of consuming products" (Reference Acosta SaignesAcosta Saignes [1938] 2009, 144).
The reason for this situation, according to Acosta Saignes, was that the labor regimes on the latifundios, such as labor tenancy and sharecropping, kept workers mired in poverty and unable to consume manufactured goods. Although he recognized the design of depression investment and all-encompassing state employ, Acosta Saignes'south primary focus was on ending the exploitation of the peasantry and rural laborers. This could only be achieved, he argued, through a country reform that would divide upward the large estates and redistribute them among the peasants, thus catastrophe their dependence on diverse forms of tenancy and dissolving precapitalist productive relations. "The semi-feudal forms of production and labor relations must be replaced past others of a capitalist form," he argued (Reference Acosta SaignesAcosta Saignes [1938] 2009, 143).
This was likewise the view of the so-called feudal current of scholars in Brazil, who were engaged in a contend near whether the latifundio represented the vestiges of a feudal system or had always been thoroughly capitalist (Reference SodréSodré 1944; Reference GuimarãesGuimarães 1964; Reference FurtadoFurtado 1964; Reference Prado JúniorPrado Júnior 1966). For Guimarães, the chief objective of any land reform would be to "uproot and destroy, in our agriculture, the feudal type of relations of production"(1964, 32). These included the latifundio'due south monopoly on state, the extraeconomic power of landowners over peasants, and the backward labor regimes that predominated in the countryside. Much similar Acosta Saignes, Guimarães saw these productive relations equally limiting the domestic market needed for industrialization: "all of this pre-backer apparatus of product and distribution … decapitalizes the country and limits the industrial development; and to the extent that it constricts the purchasing ability of the rural masses, it limits the expansion of the domestic market" (Reference GuimarãesGuimarães 1964, 34).Footnote ane
Many of Latin America's communist parties adopted this view as well—indeed many of these scholars were communist party members themselves—and the struggle against feudal relations became an essential part of their strategy in the postwar period. This led them to seek alliances with their respective national bourgeoisies, seen every bit fundamental agents in eradicating feudal relations, who could assist them in their aim of ushering in capitalism and allowing for an eventual transition to a postcapitalist order.
But, ironically, just effectually the time political activists and scholars began emphasizing the backward social relations in agriculture, those very relations were beginning to disappear throughout Latin America. By the centre of the twentieth century, the increasing mobilization of peasant organizations demanding "all land to the tiller," and the growing calls for country reform amidst scholars and political leaders, were forcing landowners to legitimate their holdings and avoid expropriation by shifting away from the various forms of tenancy toward more direct control over production. In add-on, a decline in labor shortages meant in that location was a decreasing demand to secure laborers through tenancy, so tenants could be replaced by wage-laborers (Reference De Janvryde Janvry 1981, 82). This resulted in the widespread commutation of wage laborers for tenants, and, in the optics of many, a transition to a thoroughly backer mode of product.
Around this same time, the fence nearly the role of feudal or noncapitalist forms of production provoked disquisitional responses from scholars influenced by the emerging dependency school of thought. Authors like Andre Gunder Frank (Reference Frank1967) and Caio Prado Júnior (Reference Prado Júnior1966) argued that the latifundio had never represented feudal relations at all, but rather had been thoroughly backer from the beginning. Frank pointed to the commercial nature of the big estates and the fact that they were often engaged in commodity product for international markets, not closed off subsistence product. This was seen as proof that capitalism had completely penetrated the periphery going back to the colonial catamenia.
This claim from the dependentistas was partly due to their desire to explain underdevelopment as a product of integration into a capitalist globe economy. They argued that countries on the periphery were progressively underdeveloped past the penetration of capitalism and their incorporation into the capitalist world arrangement every bit primary exporters. Underdevelopment was largely a product of external forces, the relations between the periphery and the city, and the periphery'southward dependence on the metropolis for export markets, capital, and technology. Therefore, attempts to explain underdevelopment based on peripheral countries' internal dynamics—the presence of certain relations of production—presented a challenge to dependency's accent on the backer world system.
Equally dependency's influence declined in the final decades of the twentieth century, more recent approaches began turning attention back to various factors internal to these countries. Yet, for the most part, the focus shifted away from the agrestal question. Given that the labor regimes in agriculture had been transformed along capitalist lines in the 2nd one-half of the twentieth century, it seemed there was no longer an incomplete transition that needed to occur in the countryside. With capitalist labor relations fully in identify, much of the focus turned to the state, what office the state should play in promoting economical development, and what should be left to marketplace forces. Gratuitous market advocates chosen for profoundly reducing the role of the land in the economy, while other theorists responded past emphasizing the importance of state intervention, the need for greater state capacity, and the type of interventions the state must make to be successful (Reference EvansEvans 1995; Reference DiJohnDiJohn 2009).
Past the twenty-offset century, it was argued that nosotros had reached the "end of the agrarian question" in the developing globe (Reference BernsteinBernstein 1996, Reference Bernstein2006). Globalization and the integration of southern agriculture into global commodity chains and networks of corporate agribusiness had rendered the agrarian question obsolete, equally the linkages between domestic agriculture and industry had been replaced by international circuits and world markets. In addition, the disappearance of past forms of "predatory landed property," such as the feudal-like latifundios, and the "generalization of commodity relations" in the countryside meant that capitalism had fully permeated agriculture in the global South, thus ending the debate most precapitalist obstacles to development (Reference BernsteinBernstein 2006).
Much similar earlier debates, more recent debates focus largely on the labor regimes in agriculture, with piddling attention given to rural property relations. Though some however fence for the relevance of agriculture in industrialization (Reference Byres, Fine and FilhoByres 2012; Reference KayKay 2002), both sides of the debate tend to agree that the defining characteristics of agrarian commercialism are the proletarianization of rural labor and the market integration of rural productive units. Akram-Lodhi and Kay (Reference Akram-Lodhi and Kay2010, 256) note in a review of the debates that "a central moment in the development of rural capitalism" was "the emergence of generalized rural wage labor and, every bit a corollary, the emergence of agrarian upper-case letter." Meanwhile, for Bernstein (Reference Bernstein2006, 454), backer relations are denoted by "how economies are located in international divisions of labor, and circuits of majuscule and commodities."
The globalization of agribusiness and the increasing integration of southern agriculture into global markets are seen as proof that capitalist imperatives and market forces have thoroughly penetrated the global South. According to Akram-Lodhi and Kay (Reference Akram-Lodhi and Kay2010, 271), "the productive subsector that produces to sell must strive under the market imperative to meliorate its competitive profitability within a law of value that is global in telescopic." This means that those who produce for the market are "strongly bound by the logic of the market imperative, in that [they] must continually strive to improve competitiveness" (Reference Akram-Lodhi and KayAkram-Lodhi and Kay 2010, 271). In other words, integration into world markets has created the universalization of capitalist imperatives on a global scale. Producers in the South are now, as Bernstein (Reference Bernstein2004, 139) puts it, exposed "to the same fundamental forces of backer grade relations and differentiation equally their counterparts in Europe or N America."
However, the problem with these characterizations is that they do non take into account the specific property relations in agriculture in Latin America and other parts of the global South. That is, they do not account for the specific relationships that exist between producers and their land, and whether admission to land is mediated by market competition. As has been argued by Brenner (Reference Brenner1982), the existence of specific property relations is essential to the functioning of the market imperatives feature of capitalist society. Regardless of the presence of wage labor or market integration, in the absence of backer property relations the basic forces of capitalist competition and marketplace discipline will not part, and thus producers will not be bailiwick to market coercion.
The persistence of large, underproductive landholdings in Latin America provides ample prove of this. Those who claim that the forces of capital are universal and that all product is bailiwick to the same basic marketplace forces cannot account for what is withal today the most ascendant sector in many Latin American countries—the large landed estate. These estates are widely recognized for maintaining uncompetitive production methods and greatly underutilizing the land they occupy. And though they operate with wage labor and are frequently highly integrated into world markets, they tend to exist allowed to market place pressures, maintaining low-investment, low-risk product strategies and all-encompassing as opposed to intensive uses of the land.
The reason for this, I fence, is that these productive units maintain distinct property relations that make them not bailiwick to the same primal forces of capitalist competition equally producers in the global Northward. The long-standing focus by scholars on the labor regimes in agriculture has meant they have largely ignored this important attribute of the rural economic system, and thus take failed to understand the underlying dynamics of Latin American agronomics and its role in the region's underdevelopment. As I argue in the next section, the presence of specific belongings relations is the key mechanism backside sustained processes of capital aggregating, and this machinery is largely absent in much of Latin American agriculture.
The Primacy of Belongings Relations
If much of the analysis on Latin America has tended to associate capitalism with the presence of wage labor and marketplace integration, scholars take too tended to meet the relationship between uppercase and labor as the driving forcefulness behind the process of majuscule accumulation. As Alain de Janvry states in his well-known work on the agrarian question in Latin America: "The aggregating of capital is the objective force that guides the historical development of capitalism, and the exploitation of labor by capital is the mechanism by which this aggregating occurs" (Reference De Janvryde Janvry 1981, 8).
Thus, the transition to wage labor on Latin America'southward estates is ofttimes associated with a sure modernization and development of the productive forces in agriculture (Reference BernsteinBernstein 2006; Reference KayKay 2002). Indeed, it is often argued that the transition to commercialism in Latin America was a transition "from above" in which the precapitalist estates transformed themselves internally along the lines of Lenin's "junker road" as they gradually shifted to wage labor and expelled tenant laborers (Reference De Janvryde Janvry 1981, 111). As the latifundios adopted more than modern labor regimes, they also began to adopt more modern methods of product, and became increasingly capitalized in the second half of the twentieth century. In other words, the shift in labor regimes meant these estates became fully capitalist, and this new relationship between labor and uppercase was the mechanism that drove capital aggregating.
All the same, what this view ignores is that the market forces that drive accumulation in capitalism depend much more than on the commodification of the means of production, such equally land, than on the commodification of labor (Reference BrennerBrenner 1982; Reference WoodForest 2002). Regardless of whether or not wage labor is employed, it is simply when land becomes a article that is traded on the market that producers may be forced to make competitive use of their land and to sell competitively on the market in society to maintain possession of the state. Indeed, some of the almost advanced and dynamic agriculture in the globe, such as that of the United states of america, has mostly fabricated little use of wage labor in its historical evolution. Instead, it was the generalized commodification of land that forced producers to plow surpluses back into product, innovate, and transform the productive process to lucifer the contest and stay in business (Reference PostPost 2011).Footnote 2
It is for these reasons that the key mechanism backside capital accumulation is actually not the labor relations in agriculture, equally de Janvry suggests, but rather specific belongings relations. These relations, when predominant in a given social club, facilitate the performance of market imperatives and impose market subject field on producers to maximize the output of their state, making upper-case letter aggregating get generalized and systematic (Reference PostPost 2011; Reference BrennerBrenner 1982). Those that do not systematically reinvest surpluses back into production may risk being unable maintain a competitive rate of profitability, be unable to remain solvent, and thereby lose possession of their land. In this way, it is the property relations that create the market discipline feature of backer society and thus the continuous drive to maximize profits.
In many Latin American countries, these specifically capitalist holding relations accept seldom materialized on the large estates, despite the transition to wage labor and a high level of market integration. Indeed, scholars have seldom focused much attention on the specific relationship between landowners and their land in Latin America. Nevertheless, the specific ways in which land has been appropriated throughout history has meant that landowners are often under little force per unit area to produce their land effectively or to maximize profits in guild to maintain possession.
Going back to colonial times, land in Latin America has frequently been caused outside of market mechanisms. This typically occurred through massive state grants from the crown such every bit the merced, or the sesmaria in Brazil, or, after independence, through free or low-price country concessions from national or local governments (Reference FurtadoFurtado 2003, 68–lxxx). Moreover, the illegal or informal occupation of public lands—what are known every bit tierras baldías, or terras devolutas in Brazil—has also been a common form of nonmarket state appropriation that has continuously occurred up to the nowadays day. All of this non simply led to the prevalence of massive landholdings and an extreme concentration of state, simply also, more importantly, to specific property relations in which a lack of competitive constraints meant large landowners did not demand to engage in systematic capital aggregating and could instead maintain low-intensity, depression-investment product strategies that provide rents from the land without the risk of large investments (Reference Soto Baquero and GómezSoto Baquero and Gómez 2012, 11). As Edelman (Reference Edelman1992, 22) explains: "the important point is that the dynamics of accumulation are radically different than those of classical capitalist development. Rather than investing heavily in improved technologies, employing productive human labor, attempting to capture increased market shares, or developing linkages with other production processes, latifundistas could get wealthy from harvesting natural and quasi-natural products of the country."
In other words, instead of maintaining a competitive use of the land, producers could minimize risk through more extensive uses of the land such as cattle grazing or forestry, which provide a constant income but require but a fraction of the investment. When possession of state is not mediated by market competition, producers are under few market place constraints to utilize their land competitively, allowing them to ignore productivity and channel investment abroad from production toward the diversification of their economic activities. Surpluses from agriculture can be invested into other more lucrative businesses, commercial endeavors, or the acquisition of more than land, with fiddling need for systematic reinvestment.
This productive logic has continued upward to the present 24-hour interval on large estates throughout much of Latin America. Though country was widely commodified by the twentieth century, and land markets became the principal means of acquiring land, the property relations on large estates were frequently not significantly changed. This is because the full general pattern of state appropriation came to be characterized by a logic of portfolio diversification (Reference Bicalho and HoefleBicalho and Hoefle 1989; Reference RichaniRichani 2012). That is, land is caused past individuals who have accumulated wealth from various economic activities, commonly commerce or other urban endeavors, and who seek to invest in state as a speculative investment, or as a store of wealth in the context of high inflation. This blazon of land cribbing is similar to what de Janvry (Reference De Janvry1981, 109) described equally the "merchant road" to commercialism in Latin America. All the same, unlike de Janvry's characterization, the effect has not been conducive to capital letter accumulation.
Because country is appropriated nether a logic of portfolio diversification, it means the owners possess various other sources of wealth and income and therefore do non depend on the output of the land. Regardless of the fact that the land is caused on the market, the owners are under footling market pressure to use the country competitively in order to maintain possession of it. Instead, land tin can be paid for with wealth generated from other economic activities, and profits from the land can be channeled dorsum to those economical activities or into an even greater diversification of investments. Instead of beingness used equally a productive asset, land is treated as a medium for storing wealth that otherwise would be eroded past inflation or taxed by the state, with the bodily product of the country playing only a secondary part. In other words, this specific relationship betwixt producers and their land results in a short-circuiting of capital accumulation in agriculture.
In fact, the so-chosen modernization that occurred on large estates in the 2nd one-half of the twentieth century has often been characterized past scholars as a "conservative" modernization, or "pseudo-modernization" (Reference Bicalho and HoefleBicalho and Hoefle 1989). Many landowners began to implement mod technologies and methods on their farms such equally improved crop varieties, animal breeds, and fertilizers, notwithstanding they oftentimes continued to employ low-investment production strategies that greatly underutilized the land. All-encompassing activities like cattle grazing connected to operate largely equally before, equally Bicalho and Hoefle (Reference Bicalho and Hoefle1990, 57) explain for northeast Brazil: "While the new system of cattle raising uses such technical innovations equally planted pasture, pasture divisions with rotation of use, purchased brute feed, improved breeds and the greater use of vaccines, which together with the use of waged labour, satisfy the most demanding definitions of capitalized agronomics, the productivity per hectare has not increased significantly. Mere pseudo-modernisation has occurred. The ranches have all the trappings of being highly productive merely the pastures merely have 1 or two steers per hectare."
Even in the context of neoliberalism and the opening up of markets, landowners who have caused country every bit portfolio diversification are oftentimes not under market pressure to make significant investments or better productivity, as their continued possession of the country does non depend on competitive production. Neoliberal reforms to land markets accept done footling to alter this, since it is not the functioning of land markets that creates this scenario, but rather the predominant forms of land cribbing among elites that generate specific property relations. Therefore, even in the context of dynamic country markets, aristocracy state tin can often remain underutilized or entirely unproductive without the threat of foreclosure or defalcation.
In what follows, I endeavour to demonstrate how widespread this productive logic is in Latin America today. Although information technology is hard to determine the true extent of certain property relations, agronomical census data can demonstrate how prevalent big landholdings are throughout the region and how they employ the land that they occupy. As I will prove, the data on large estates reveals the prevalence of low-risk, depression-investment production strategies, and there is bear witness from various countries of widespread portfolio-based land cribbing that gives rise to this type of productive logic. In the concluding section, I address the possible consequences of the region's particular agricultural logic for larger processes of industrialization and economic development.
The Prevalence of the Latifundio
For this department, contempo agricultural demography data was collected from six major Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, United mexican states, Peru, and Venezuela. The type and corporeality of data collected in each country's census varies considerably, and therefore the depth of analysis is limited by the availability of the data. For this reason, the focus will exist mostly on Brazil and Peru, which take the nigh detailed data, and will include merely limited data from Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico.
The start thing to note from the data is the connected authority of big landholdings in these countries. Despite frequent claims over the years that the large estates would disappear due to their inefficiency and inability to compete with the more productive small and medium producers, this does not appear to be the case. Every bit Table 1 shows, big holdings of 500 hectares or greater occupy the majority of agricultural country in all of the countries studied,Footnote 3 and the largest holdings of greater than 1,000 hectares occupy near half of all agricultural land in Brazil and Venezuela, more than two-thirds in Peru, and three-quarters of all agronomical land in Argentina and Colombia.Footnote 4
Table 1: Country concentration in Latin American countries (pct of landholdings/pct of agricultural state).
In other words, though state concentration has decreased in some places in contempo years, it is withal extreme in most major Latin American countries, and the countryside continues to be dominated by large landholdings. Even so, it should be noted that in that location are significant differences both between and within countries. In some countries, such as Chile, big unproductive estates are practically nonexistent (Reference BengoaBengoa 2013), whereas in other countries, such as Colombia, they are ubiquitous. Too, there are often significant differences from 1 region of a country to the next. Northeast Brazil, for example, has a significantly dissimilar agrestal structure from southern or southeastern Brazil, and these differences should non be disregarded.
Moreover, concentrated ownership and the authority of large holdings does not necessarily mean the land is underutilized, nor that it is operated under a logic of run a risk minimization. In some regions, large farms are used for intensive mechanized agronomics, and areas of highly productive agriculture have developed in many Latin American countries. Indeed, countries like Brazil and Argentina take experienced a major smash in soybean production in contempo years, and much of this production is carried out on very large, mechanized farms.
Therefore, to get an idea of the relative weight of large mechanized farms as compared to other less intensive forms of product I look to data on state apply specific to large farms. Figure i shows state use on large holdings in Brazil, Colombia, and Republic of peru, the only countries for which state use data specific to farm size was available. These holdings are almost entirely dominated past extensive activities similar grazing and forest, with over lxxx percent of the land they occupy defended to these two activities, while only a pocket-size portion is used for tillage. This appears to be the instance for the other countries too, as data on overall land apply reflects this aforementioned full general pattern. In other words, while information technology is true that in some regions large holdings are used for intensive tillage, the overall trend is clearly the opposite—extensive activities similar grazing and forest predominate on Latin America'southward big farms.
Effigy 1: Land utilise on large holdings (>500ha) in Brazil, Peru, and Colombia. Sources: IBGE (2012), DANE (2015), INEI (2012).
Not only do extensive activities predominate, merely land use statistics reveal the low-investment and low-productivity nature of these types of production. On grazing land, for example, if nosotros divide the total number of animals on large farms by total hectares of pasture, Brazil'due south large farms accept but 0.65 animals per hectare of grazing land, while in Peru information technology is an incredibly low 0.06 animals per hectare (IBGE 2012; INEI 2012). This means that these landowners average far less than 1 brute for every hectare of grazing country, whereas smallholdings may accept anywhere from 2 to 10 animals per hectare. In Peru, small-scale farms of under fifty hectares boilerplate 12 animals per hectare of grazing state, about two hundred times greater than the land's large estates (INEI 2012).
In addition, much of the land dedicated to grazing and forest is entirely unimproved, meaning that the landowners accept invested little to nothing in the country and just harvest it for its natural and seminatural products. On Brazil's large ranches, 33 percentage of all grazing state is unimproved, whereas on Peru's nearly 95 pct is unimproved (IBGE 2012; INEI 2012). This means there has been no investment in such things every bit planted or irrigated pastures, new grass varieties, or fertilizers that can raise the productivity of grazing land. This data was not available for big holdings in the other countries, but the situation is likely to be very like. In Venezuela, 73 per centum of all grazing land is unimproved (GBV 2010).
In other words, much of the livestock production in these countries takes place on vast expanses of largely unimproved land with a very low density of livestock per hectare. This is in stark contrast to livestock operations in Northward America or Europe, where nearly all product involves planted and fertilized pasture, as well every bit intensive, concentrated factory farms such as feedlots or other types of confined feeding operations. In cattle product, feedlots have but very recently begun to be used in some Latin American countries, with about 5 percentage of cattle production in Brazil now passing through feedlots, and well-nigh a 3rd in Argentina due to regime subsidies that began in 2007 (Reference Guevara and GrünwaldtGuevara and Grünwaldt 2012).
Additional data on agronomical methods and technologies further reveals the express nature of the modernization of Latin America'southward big estates. Every bit diverse scholars have pointed out, the large farms often adopt some modernistic technologies while still maintaining low-intensity activities that underutilize the land. Tabular array ii shows the percentage of large landholdings in Brazil and Peru that use various methods and technologies associated with mod agriculture. Simply a minority of these farms invests in fertilizers, insecticides, or irrigation, and very few apply harvesters or other agricultural machinery. Although a bulk of big farms in Brazil have tractors, these are often used equally a means of transportation and immigration of land, not for cultivation. And while vaccinations are widely used in both countries, very few large cattle farms in either country employ artificial insemination.
Tabular array 2: Percentage of landholdings that employ various technologies.
Given the fact that Brazil has one of the more dynamic agricultural sectors in the region, it is likely that the residue of the countries are even less modernized. The information for all holdings in Mexico and Venezuela gives an idea of how prevalent the diverse technologies are throughout the agronomical sector in these countries. In both cases, a minority of landholdings employs technologies associated with modernized agriculture, and we could likely await similar or perhaps lower rates among the big estates that occupy most of the land.
Brazil's census data on production and investment provides another indication of the low-productivity logic of large holdings. While big farms of five hundred hectares or greater occupy 56 pct of all agricultural land in Brazil, they account for only 36 percent of the total value of product and make up only 43 pct of total investment (IBGE 2012). This is in precipitous contrast to small farms of less than fifty hectares, which occupy only thirteen percent of the land yet business relationship for 35 pct of the total value of production and 28 per centum of total investment. In other words, the large farms occupy more than iv times as much state as pocket-sized farms, still have only 1 percent greater total value of production and only fifteen percent greater full investment. These findings are further supported by information from Brazil's agrarian reform agency, which reported in 2010 that more than 50 percent of all big landholdings and 72 percent of all land occupied by large holdings was considered "unproductive" according to agency parameters (INCRA 2011).Footnote 5
Thus, despite the limitations of agricultural census data, we can confirm that the agrestal structures in these countries go along to be characterized by extreme land concentration and are dominated by large estates that employ depression-investment, low-productivity production strategies. What gives rise to this state of affairs, I fence, is the prevalence of portfolio-based land appropriation and the resulting property relations, which exempt large landowners from market pressures to maximize the productivity of their landholdings. However, detailed information on land appropriation tin can seldom be constitute in agricultural census data, and then I turn to secondary literature for evidence of this.
Portfolio-based state cribbing
There is extensive prove of portfolio-based land appropriation and other similar types of speculative country investment throughout much of Latin America. De Janvry (Reference De Janvry1981, 109) described this "merchant route" to capitalism equally 1 of the principal ways in which capitalism developed in the Latin American countryside in the twentieth century. Capital generated in various business concern activities is invested in rural landholdings for speculative purposes or for purposes of farm production, often under absentee management and with the utilise of wage labor. But while de Janvry associated this urban investment in land as a source of dynamism in agriculture, subsequent studies have associated it with extensive, depression-productivity, low-investment productive strategies.
In Brazil, Bicalho and Hoefle (Reference Bicalho and Hoefle1989, Reference Bicalho and Hoefle2008) note that land cribbing by urban capital is common throughout much of the country just especially in the underdeveloped Northeast and Amazonian frontier. Their research in one region of Paraíba State showed that nearly ii-thirds of big landowners in this region earned more than 75 percent of their income from urban sources, and that they typically used the land for extensive cattle grazing with trivial concern for raising productivity. Despite the fact that substantially higher profits could be earned through tillage of various greenbacks crops, or that the use of fodder or irrigated pasture could double or triple the productivity of cattle raising, survey data showed that landowners typically preferred to use land as a "low-adventure, low-income investment for portfolio diversification," diverting surpluses to "other more lucrative investments like urban and rural land speculation" (Reference Bicalho and HoefleBicalho and Hoefle 1989, 43).
Extensive cattle ranching is preferred past the landowners because it is "bailiwick to less market take a chance" and "operating costs are lower and seasonal toll fluctuation is not every bit pronounced equally in cropping" (Reference Bicalho and HoefleBicalho and Hoefle 1989, 41). A similar logic exists with the widespread cattle ranching on the Amazonian frontier as well. Much of the investment in large cattle ranches in the Amazon comes from wealthy investors from southern Brazil or from local urban-based merchants seeking to diversify their portfolios. Scholars in Brazil have long recognized this type of state appropriation to be associated with unproductive holdings or an underutilization of the land (Reference SalesSales 1982; Reference BarbosaBarbosa 1998), and indeed this is the example with cattle ranching in the Amazon. The process has get known in Brazil as pecuarização, or "cattleization," equally massive areas of potential cropland are converted into all-encompassing pastures for cattle.
In Colombia, scholars take pointed to a very similar scenario in which much of the agricultural country has been bought up by wealthy investors as a hedge confronting inflation and revenue enhancement and then used for extensive cattle ranching or other depression-investment activities (Reference Heath, Binswanger and LutzHeath and Binswanger 1998). Between 2001 and 2013, the corporeality of land occupied past large farms of 5 hundred hectares or greater increased from 61 percent to 77 percent, the vast majority of which is used for grazing (Reference Fajardo MontanaFajardo Montana 2008; Reference Vergara VergaraVergara Vergara 2010). Richani (Reference Richani2012) argues that a good portion of the investment in cattle ranching comes from the "narco-bourgeoisie"—individuals involved in the drug merchandise that use land as a mechanism for laundering money. Still, other sectors of the bourgeoisie are equally involved, as individuals with various concern activities see it in their interest to invest in land to shelter uppercase gains or for speculative purposes.
The outcome is that despite its lower economic returns, cattle ranching is the preferred activity for Colombia'south landholding elite. Regardless of whether the state is fertile, landowners minimize risk past using it for grazing, resulting in a highly grazing-dominated agricultural sector throughout the country. According to Kalmanovitz and López (Reference Kalmanovitz, Enciso and Bonilla2009), Colombia has at least 21.5 million hectares of country suitable for cultivation, notwithstanding merely most 20 percent is actually used for cultivation, by and large by smallholders. Meanwhile, around forty meg hectares are currently used for grazing, whereas but well-nigh fourteen million are deemed suitable for such use. In other words, about two-thirds of the country currently used for grazing is actually suitable for other, more profitable activities like intensive cultivation.
In Central America, the same logic has been uncovered, despite the fact that cattle ranching and beef product have been increasingly integrated into Us markets since the 1960s. Williams (Reference Williams1986) traced the beef consign boom in Central America in the second half of the twentieth century and found that although cattle production underwent modernization and began using a number of new technologies and inputs, it remained dominated by the erstwhile landowning elite and urban-based investors, who tended to utilize land for extensive grazing and often used their influence to expand onto untitled peasant and forest lands.
Edelman (Reference Edelman1992) detailed the logic of these big estates in one region of Costa Rica and plant that large, underutilized landholdings persisted in that location throughout the beefiness export boom. Cattle production increased during the smash largely on the basis of all-encompassing growth and the expansion of grazing lands "rather than from any significant intensification of production on existing grasslands" (Reference EdelmanEdelman 1992, 247). Though certain technologies and improved practices were adopted, the number of caput per hectare of pasture hardly increased since the 1950s, and in many cases really declined. This was because the landowning elite were "nether piddling pressure to modernize" since their families had acquired the state generations agone, but also because of the "possibilities for speculative proceeds," as landowners could obtain cheap credit and divert surpluses toward other, more lucrative activities (Reference EdelmanEdelman 1992, 252).
As a result, much of Cardinal America'south fertile land is at present used for cattle grazing, and vast tracts of the tropical forests in countries like Honduras, Costa rica, and Republic of el salvador take been burned and converted into pasture in contempo years. In Republic of honduras, more 40 percent of the nation'southward fertile country had been occupied by cattle ranching by the 1990s (Reference Gradwohl and GreenbergGradwohl and Greenberg 1988, 42). Likely a greater portion is occupied today as producers continue to convert state to cattle production to supply the Usa' demand for beef.
Finally, inquiry in Venezuela confirms that this same general pattern of country appropriation and depression-investment productive logic is present there too. Extensive cattle ranches dominate much of the land, even in regions that contain some of the country'due south most fertile agricultural lands, where there is potential for much higher profits with intensive cultivation (World Depository financial institution 1993). Because much of the state was bought up by wealthy investors from outside of agriculture with diversified investments in various economic activities, at that place is a virtual lack of market discipline to strength them to maximize the productivity of their holdings. Instead, they apply the land for extensive cattle grazing while channeling profits into cyberbanking, commerce, and agribusiness (Reference CarlsonCarlson 2017).
The prevalence of this productive logic amongst large holdings throughout much of Latin America has led to a state of affairs in which a majority of the agronomical land in these countries is underutilized or completely unproductive. Census data evidence that most countries use less than one-5th of their agricultural country for cultivation, while the residual is used for extensive activities. Republic of colombia is the well-nigh extreme example, with more than 80 percent of all agricultural land used for grazing, and only viii percent dedicated to crops (DANE 2015). Other countries are not far behind, as Venezuela cultivates simply 13 pct of its agricultural land, and Brazil and Peru only 18 percent (GBV 2010; IBGE 2012; INEI 2012).
This does not announced to be due to a lack of land suitable for tillage. According to the FAO (2000), South and Central America take vast amounts of potentially abundant land that could support the expansion of rain-fed agriculture. Withal these regions accept amid the everyman level of utilization of their agronomical potential in the world, second only to sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2000, 39).
As Effigy 2 shows, most of these countries announced to accept relatively large amounts of arable land, all the same they tend to cultivate but a very small portion of that land. Meanwhile, in every case analyzed, grazing takes upward a unduly large corporeality of agronomical land. In other words, well-nigh of these countries would announced to be greatly underutilizing their agricultural potential non only in terms of the types of agronomical activities that boss agricultural land but as well in terms of the amount of land they use for agricultural purposes. In the next section, I argue that this state of affairs has important consequences for industrialization and overall economic development.
Figure 2: Potential abundant land vs. actual land utilise. Source: Based on agricultural demography data and data from FAO (2000).
Agronomics and Industrialization
Regardless of the prevalence of low-productivity latifundios in Latin America, there is still the question of how relevant this is for overall economic development in these countries. When Latin American scholars were writing in the mid-twentieth century almost the importance of the latifundio, agriculture still made upwards a substantial portion of Latin American economies. Today, nonetheless, the agricultural sector accounts for only about v to 10 percent of GDP in most cases. This would seem to suggest that the dynamics of the agronomical sector are no longer very important for the overall economic system and therefore that agriculture no longer really "matters" for economic development in Latin America.
But despite its reduced share in the economy, at that place is reason to believe that agriculture still plays an important role. Studies have shown that when frontward and backward linkages are included, the share of agriculture in Latin American economies can increase to over 30 percent of Gdp (IICA 2004). Meanwhile, growth in the agricultural sector has been associated with positive developmental furnishings that are roughly twice as large equally agronomics's bodily GDP share (Reference De Ferranti, Perry, Foster, Lederman and ValdésDe Ferranti et al. 2005, 61–72). In other words, even though the agronomical sector in Latin America tends to be rather small-scale relative to the size of the national economy, it tin however have large impacts on the rest of the economy through "spillover" or "multiplier effects" and through linkages between agriculture and other sectors.
The predominance of depression-productivity latifundio agriculture in many countries, however, suggests that these linkages and "multiplier furnishings" are non near every bit stiff as they could exist. Low levels of investment and utilization of industrial inputs mean that the agronomical sector is providing a much weaker source of demand for upstream industries than would otherwise be the case, and, equally a outcome, backward linkages to agriculture tend to be relatively small. Moreover, low agricultural productivity negatively impacts wages, which then reduces demand for manufactured appurtenances from consumers. Studies have shown that rural wages are positively correlated with the level of sophistication of agriculture, in terms of use of fertilizer and irrigation, through college labor productivity (Reference Gasparini, Gutiérrez and PortoGasparini, Gutiérrez, and Porto 2004). Yet, every bit I accept shown, the adoption of these methods is very low on the large estates that occupy most of the country in Latin America. Meanwhile, agricultural productivity affects wages, both rural and urban, past virtue of the touch on on food prices; low productivity forces consumers to spend a large portion of their income on food, thus eroding consumer demand for other goods (Reference Irz, Lin, Thirtle and WigginsIrz et al. 2001).
All of this means that low agricultural productivity tin take a negative touch on domestic demand for manufactured goods in these countries and, thereby, can impact the development of local industries. Effigy iii shows the human relationship betwixt labor productivity in agronomics and level of industrialization for Latin American countries compared to loftier-income OECD countries. As it shows, Latin American countries remain far less industrialized than most of their counterparts in the developed world and, likewise, have much lower agronomical productivity. Moreover, in that location is a fairly strong human relationship between the two variables, where increasing agricultural productivity is strongly associated with an increasing level of industrialization. This would seem to support the argument that low productivity agriculture continues to exist an important barrier to industrialization.
Figure 3: Agricultural productivity and manufacturing value added (MVA) per capita, Latin American vs. developed countries (thousands of United states of america dollars). Source: World Banking concern (2012), 10-centrality on a log scale with base x.
Of course, it could be argued that the direction of causality is the reverse; that it is industrialization that drives increasing productivity in agriculture, not the other fashion around. Nonetheless, this does not align well with much of the historical evidence. As Dieter Senghaas notes in his review of European development processes, "nowhere has industrial evolution reached the state of self-sustaining growth unless an increase in agronomical productivity preceded or accompanied industrialization" (Reference SenghaasSenghaas 1985, 52, accent in original). In Europe, there was "a clear correlation between agricultural modernization and successful industrialization, or else betwixt the lack of agricultural modernization and the failure of industrialization," and this is due to the fact that "the size of the industrial sector depends directly on agronomical productivity" (Reference SenghaasSenghaas 1985, 47). Others have made similar arguments for the developing globe, where the size of a country'southward domestic marketplace for industrial goods is seen as largely dependent on the level of productivity of local agronomics, and thus the growth possibilities for local industries depend on the level of demand generated by agriculture (Reference LewisLewis 1978; Reference MundleMundle 1985).
Indeed, for much of the developed globe, the historical record supports the notion that industrialization was accomplished largely on the basis of expanding domestic markets rather than via trade or exports, and this expansion was fueled by increasing agronomical productivity. This occurred start in England, where industrialization was driven by important changes in the agrestal structure that led to systematic gains in productivity through the widespread adoption of new innovations, methods, and technologies, which increased output and improved efficiency (Reference ZmolekZmolek 2014, 165–214). These changes spurred industrial growth every bit rural producers began systematically investing surpluses in inputs and capital goods, thereby creating expanding markets for local industries, while increasing agronomical productivity raised rural incomes and thereby rural consumption of manufactured goods. Strange markets, on the other manus, are estimated to have only played a modest part, accounting for only 10 pct of gross national product in the menses leading up to the Industrial Revolution, and even less for much the rest of Western Europe (Reference O'BrienO'Brien 1982).
Nihon is some other important case, given that it is unremarkably seen as a example of export-led development. In fact, domestic sources of demand are estimated to accept made upwardly anywhere from 75 to eighty percentage of aggregate demand throughout the period of industrialization (Reference Ohkawa and RosovskyOhkawa and Rosovsky 1973). And hither besides it is argued that an agrarian revolution starting every bit early on every bit the seventeenth century laid the foundation for that industrial growth (Reference MundleMundle 1985). In other words, industrialization in the adult earth was fueled much more by internal rather than external demand, with much of it originating in agronomics. Perhaps the but true cases of consign-led evolution are Republic of korea and Taiwan, and even here it is argued that important changes in the countryside, such equally the transformation of agrarian class structures, were important factors for industrialization (Reference KayKay 2002; Reference DavisDavis 2004).
Therefore, if Latin American countries are to move upwardly the scale to higher levels of industrialization like their more developed counterparts, information technology would seem that industrial growth will demand to exist fueled past increasing domestic demand for manufactured goods, and this volition likely need to accept a big agricultural component. As evidenced by both the historical record and statistical data cited above, increasing agricultural productivity stimulates demand for local industries through a variety of linkages to the rest of the economy and can therefore allow for a deepening of the industrialization process past expanding domestic markets. Indeed, the size of local markets can be a crucial factor in the viability of many industries, especially those industries that rely on economies of calibration or have meaning ship costs.
It is in this sense that the persistence of a brackish, low-productivity agricultural sector in Latin America should be seen equally an important bulwark to industrialization. The fact that the vast bulk of the countryside in these countries is dominated by big landholdings that invest relatively niggling in industrial inputs or productivity-enhancing engineering means that demand for manufactured appurtenances is significantly constrained. This is not only because landowners purchase relatively few industrial inputs that would stimulate local industries, but also because depression levels of investment in productivity translate to low wages in the countryside and higher food costs for consumers, which restrict purchasing power and overall consumption. Farthermost land concentration and the potency of extensive activities with low labor requirements are as well contributors to unemployment and rural exodus and thereby contribute to depressed wages in both rural and urban zones. All of these factors combine to create relatively weak domestic markets for many basic industries and, therefore, impede further industrialization.
Conclusion
Latin American scholars from the "feudal current" were on the right runway when they pointed to a certain "feudal" or precapitalist logic on their countries' latifundio estates as the root of their development problems. Indeed, I have argued here that a certain productive logic on large holdings was, and continues to be, a major cistron underlying underdevelopment in Latin America. But what led many of these earlier scholars astray was the emphasis they placed on the labor relations in agriculture, and the view that it was a sure relationship between capital and labor that drove capital accumulation. This meant that once precapitalist social relations were converted to wage labor in the second half of the twentieth century, and the agricultural labor force was proletarianized, many scholars came to see Latin American agronomics as fully capitalist, with no further agrarian transition in store in the countryside. Much of the subsequent analysis turned the focus away from the agrarian question, and the issue of the latifundio was seen by many as relatively unimportant by the end of the twentieth century.
I have argued here, however, that we must bring the issue of the latifundio "back in" to our explanations of underdevelopment in Latin America. In my view, the evidence suggests that the agrarian question has not been resolved throughout much of Latin America, as large landholdings continue to control and underutilize vast amounts of the region's agronomical lands, with trivial to compel them to maximize productivity. This is because the market imperatives that drive majuscule accumulation depend on specific property relations in agronomics, and these belongings relations accept non been generalized throughout much of the Latin American countryside. A long history of nonmarket appropriation of the country, together with the connected logic of portfolio-based country cribbing, means that much of the landowning elite that controls the land in these countries is under little market pressure to improve productivity and increment investment, then a productive logic of low-risk and low-investment prevails. The stop result is a short-circuiting of capital aggregating in agriculture, a pregnant weakening of the industrialization procedure, and few prospects for sustained capitalist development.
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